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ARE WE THERE YET?  
TAKING “TRIPS” TO BRAZIL AND 
EXPANDING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS 
MEDICATION 
INTRODUCTION 
n May 4, 2007, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil 
signed a decree to import a generic version of the Merck owned 
HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenez.1 This unprecedented decree was issued after 
failed negotiations with Merck, during which Brazil’s health ministry 
rejected an offer by the company to lower the drug’s price by thirty per-
cent.2 Brazil cited the compulsory licensing provision in the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), 
claiming that this provision allows the government to override pharma-
ceutical patents in cases of national emergency or public interest.3 
TRIPS is the international trade agreement that gives pharmaceutical 
companies patent rights in every member nation of the World Trade Or-
ganization (“WTO”).4 Patent protection provides the patent owner a tem-
porary monopoly to exclusively produce and sell a certain medication.5 
Patent rights are important because they allow pharmaceutical companies 
to recoup and make a profit on the high research and development costs 
invested in making a drug, thus incentivizing the creation of new medica-
tion.6 However, due to the owner’s temporary monopoly power, patent 
rights allow the patent holder to charge prices for the drug that may be 
prohibitively high for some developing nations.7 Acknowledging the 
                                                                                                             
 1. Compulsory License Issued for Merck’s Efavirenz, 21 World Intell. Prop. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 6 (June 2007) [hereinafter BNA Report]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE 
AGREEMENTS 17 (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm# 
understanding_chapter (download Chapter 2: The Agreements for pdf version). [hereinaf-
ter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS]. 
 5. FREDERIC M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT 
LICENSING 84–85 (1977). 
 6. Id. at 84. 
 7. See Mark C. Lang, What a Long, Strange “TRIPS” It’s Been: Compulsory Li-
censing From the Adoption of TRIPS to the Agreement on Implementation of the Doha 
Declaration, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 331, 331 (2004) (discussing how one 
of the main reasons for the high HIV/AIDS infection rate in developing countries is the 
high prices of pharmaceutical products produced by Western companies). But see Bryan 
Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and 
Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 1–5 (2006) (argu-
ing that the focus on patent regulation is largely misguided because many factors, such as 
O 
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prohibitive costs of essential medicines to developing countries due to 
patents, certain flexibilities and exceptions were written into the TRIPS 
agreement.8 
One such flexibility is the compulsory licensing provision.9 The com-
pulsory licensing provision allows developing countries to produce or 
buy generic versions of the patented medication, thus reducing the cost 
of the medicine.10 The compulsory licensing provision has been invoked 
more than a dozen times, including by economically deprived countries 
with very high rates of HIV infection.11 However, middle-income coun-
tries like Brazil have frequently used the threat of the compulsory licens-
ing provision in order to have stronger bargaining power in their negotia-
tions with pharmaceutical companies.12 Brazil’s recent use of the provi-
sion to import generic HIV/AIDS medication has created heated contro-
versy as to the meaning and intent of the provision. The pharmaceutical 
industry argues that as a middle-income country with a relatively low 
rate of HIV infection, Brazil’s use of the provision is not necessary and 
sets dangerous precedent by encouraging overuse of the provision.13 
                                                                                                             
lack of proper healthcare systems and corruption, are responsible for the ongoing health 
crisis in the developing world). See also Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs: The 
Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the 
Remaining WTO Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 1069, 1116–17 (1996). The market does not provide a solution for optimal drug 
pricing in the context of developing countries. Id. Although pharmaceutical companies 
generally provide different pricing schemes to different countries (based on what “the 
market will bear”), this pricing scheme still creates prohibitively high drug prices for 
many developing countries. Id. at 1117. The problem is in defining what is optimal. 
Pharmaceutical companies want to maximize their wealth and the drug prices reflect this. 
However, the optimal goal of the law should be to minimize the cost of health care with-
out ruining the pharmaceutical industry’s incentives to create more drugs. See ANTHONY 
OGUS, COSTS AND CAUTIONARY TALES: ECONOMIC INSIGHTS FOR THE LAW 30–31 (2006). 
This price will be different than the price that pharmaceutical companies want to sell at in 
order to maximize profits. Id. 
 8. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 42. Governments 
are allowed to reduce the short term costs of intellectual property protection, such as 
public health problems, through the various exceptions in the TRIPS agreement. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Consumer Project on Technology, Examples of Health-Related Compulsory Li-
censing, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2007) [hereinafter Consumer Tech]. 
 12. Id. Brazil, in its negotiations with various pharmaceutical companies, has threat-
ened at least three times to issue a compulsory license for generic production of the drug 
before the parties reached an agreement. Id. 
 13. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Statement on Brazilian Government’s Decision 
to Issue Compulsory License for STOCRIN (May 4, 2007), http://www.merck.com/ 
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This Note will discuss Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provi-
sion to import generic HIV/AIDS drugs and analyze whether Brazil’s 
actions are consistent with the meaning and intention of the TRIPS 
agreement. Part I of this Note will present a brief overview of the TRIPS 
agreement. Part II will explain the compulsory licensing provision in the 
TRIPS agreement and discuss how the provision has been used in the 
context of producing generic HIV/AIDS drugs. Part III will discuss the 
recent controversy surrounding Brazil and Merck. Finally, Part IV will 
analyze the validity of Brazil’s actions under the compulsory licensing 
provision and present policy arguments for and against Brazil’s use of 
the provision. This Note argues that Brazil’s recent use of compulsory 
licensing is valid under the TRIPS provision. It will be effective in 
strengthening Brazil’s bargaining power with pharmaceutical companies 
and ensuring that Brazil continues to be able to provide HIV/AIDS 
treatment for its citizens. 
However, the use of the compulsory licensing provision by other mid-
dle-income countries to import or produce generic HIV/AIDS medication 
demonstrates that the use of the provision should be evaluated on a case 
by case basis and may not set good policy in every circumstance. Thus, 
this Note concludes by arguing that the compulsory licensing provision 
does not provide an adequate remedy to the prohibitively high cost of 
medicines in developing countries. This Note adopts an additional rem-
edy to the access problem in which the students and faculty of research 
universities play an important role in creating greater access to essential 
medicine in developing countries. 
I. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
Intellectual property rights can be defined as “the rights given to peo-
ple over the creations of their minds.”14 The protection of intellectual 
property rights has become an increasingly important concern in interna-
                                                                                                             
newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2007_0504.html [hereinafter Merck Statement]; 
Press Release, PhRMA, Compulsory Licensing Trend Dangerous (May 14, 2007), 
http://www.phrma.org/news_room/press_releases/phrma:_compulsory_licensing_trend_d
angerous/ [hereinafter PhRMA Press Release]. 
 14. WTO, Frequently Asked Questions about TRIPS, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). Intellectual property rights are 
divided into two main categories: (1) copyrights: rights granted to authors of original 
artistic works; and (2) industrial property: this includes protection of distinctive signs 
such as trademarks and industrial property such as inventions (protected by patents), 
industrial designs, and trade secrets. Id. 
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tional trade.15 The extent of protection afforded to intellectual property 
varies widely throughout the world and this can provide a source of ten-
sion in economic relations between countries.16 As a response to the 
ever-growing concern over intellectual property protection, the nations of 
the WTO negotiated the TRIPS agreement.17 The TRIPS agreement en-
tered into force on January 1, 1995, and “is to date the most comprehen-
sive multilateral agreement on intellectual property.”18 The agreement is 
an attempt by the WTO to standardize the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights throughout the world by establishing minimum levels of pro-
tection that each WTO member country must provide for the intellectual 
property of other WTO members.19 The preamble of TRIPS generally 
describes the objective of the agreement, which is to reduce the impedi-
ments to international trade while promoting the protection of intellectual 
property.20 
                                                                                                             
 15. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39. See also 
Weissman, supra note 7, at 1075–87 (discussing the role of the U.S. pharmaceutical in-
dustry in influencing the drafting of the TRIPS agreement and how intellectual property 
rights was framed as a trade issue). 
 16. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39. 
 17. Id. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was created in 1995 as a successor to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) established at the end of World 
War II. WTO, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN BRIEF 3 (2007), 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. The WTO’s objective is to help 
trade flow “smoothly, predictably, and freely.” Id. at 1. The WTO has 150 member coun-
tries, which accounts for approximately 97% of world trade. Id. at 7. The WTO typically 
makes decisions through a consensus of its members. Id. The WTO’s agreements are a 
result of negotiations between the member countries. Id. at 4. The 1986–94 Uruguay 
Round negotiations resulted in the current set of WTO agreements. Id. at 4. One of the 
agreements that was negotiated during the Uruguay Round was the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). See UNDERSTANDING THE 
WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39. 
 18. World Trade Organization, Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2007) 
[hereinafter Overview of the TRIPS Agreement]. 
 19. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39. 
 20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The preamble of the TRIPS agreement reads: “Desiring 
to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the 
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to 
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not them-
selves become barriers to legitimate trade.” Id. at 84. 
2008] EXPANDING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS MEDICATION 1103 
The TRIPS agreement provides protection for inventions such as 
pharmaceutical patents.21 The agreement gives the pharmaceutical patent 
owner exclusive rights for making, using, offering for sale, selling, and 
importing the drug in every member nation of the WTO.22 By providing 
the patent holder exclusive rights to make and sell the drugs they have 
developed, TRIPS prevents the emergence of competition based on the 
reduction of production costs.23 In this way, pharmaceutical companies 
hold a temporary monopoly power over the drug in all WTO member 
nations. 
One of the main arguments for granting this monopoly power is that it 
provides an incentive for the future development of medicine.24 By con-
ferring a temporary monopoly over a certain drug, TRIPS allows phar-
maceutical companies to recoup the research and development (“R&D”) 
costs of producing the drug.25 If companies could not recover their R&D 
costs and make a profit on selling the drug, they would have less of an 
incentive to invest in producing the drug in the first place.26 Thus univer-
sal patent protection provides a mechanism to encourage future R&D on 
new medicines.27 
                                                                                                             
 21. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 41. To qualify for 
patent protection under the TRIPS agreement, an invention has to be new, it must be an 
“inventive step”, and it must have “industrial applicability.” TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 20, art. 27(1). Patent protection over pharmaceutical drugs lasts at least twenty years 
and must be available for both products and processes. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE 
AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 41. 
 22. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 28. 
 23. Fredrick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Ac-
cess to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY: UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 393, 408 (Keith 
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
 24. Henry Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases: Lessons 
from the Orphan Drug Act, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY: UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 457, 462 (Keith 
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). “Patents have been found to be critically 
important to pharmaceutical firms in appropriating the benefits from drug innovation.” 
Id. It takes millions of dollars to develop and get approval for a new medicine. Id. Absent 
market protection, other companies could imitate the drug and free-ride on the innova-
tor’s work. Id. Because imitation costs in pharmaceuticals are extremely low relative to 
the inovators’s costs of developing the new medicine, some form of market exclusivity is 
required to allow innovators to appropriate enough of the benefits from the drug innova-
tion to cover their large R&D costs and make a profit. Id. 
 25. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 275 (2007). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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However, the exclusive monopoly power that TRIPS confers to phar-
maceutical companies is problematic. Approximately two thirds of the 
150 WTO member nations are developing countries.28 As a result, a ma-
jor issue arising out of pharmaceutical patent protection under the TRIPS 
agreement is how to ensure that pharmaceutical patents do not prevent 
sick people in these developing nations from having access to medi-
cines.29 
II. THE COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISION 
Acknowledging the difficulties that developing countries may have in 
conforming to the TRIPS agreement, certain flexibilities and exceptions 
were written into the agreement.30 One such exception is compulsory 
licensing.31 
Compulsory licensing allows another producer to make a patented drug 
without the consent of the patent owner.32 Compulsory licensing helps 
ensure that developing countries have access to medicines while protect-
                                                                                                             
 28. WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO—DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 93 (2007), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm [hereinafter UNDER-
STANDING THE WTO: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES]. 
 29. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 42. 
 30. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 28, at 93. Ex-
cluding compulsory licensing, the other three main exceptions to patent rights are: (1) 
article 27, permits exclusion from patentability where necessary to protect public health 
and the environment; (2) article 30, which permits member nations to provide limited 
exceptions to patent exclusivity contingent upon a showing that the interests of the patent 
owner are not unreasonably infringed upon; and (3) article 40, which allows a govern-
ment to impose price controls or nondiscriminatory taxes. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
20, arts. 27(2), 30, 40(2). See also Weissman, supra note 7, at 1099. Exceptions to exclu-
sive rights are permitted when needed to “protect public health and nutrition, and to pro-
mote the public interest in sectors of vital importance” to economic development; to pre-
vent “abuse of intellectual property rights;” and to prevent unreasonable trade practices 
that “adversely affect the international transfer of technology.” TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 20, arts. 8(1), 8(2). Flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement include extra time for lower 
developed and least developed countries (“LDCs”) to fulfill their commitments. Id. arts. 
65.2, 66. 
 31. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 42. 
 32. WTO, TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET 4 (2006), http://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm00_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET]. Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement, entitled 
“Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder” is the compulsory licensing pro-
vision of the TRIPS agreement. Id. It allows member nations to make “use of the subject 
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the gov-
ernment of third parties authorized by the government.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
20, art. 31. 
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ing the rights of the patent holder.33 Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement, 
entitled “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder,” is the 
compulsory licensing provision of the agreement.34 In the context of pub-
lic health, the compulsory licensing provision is intended to permit coun-
tries to produce or import generic drugs that are more affordable than 
patented medications.35 Because the provision is an exception to the ex-
clusive rights of the patent holder, the use of the provision is restricted by 
a number of conditions aimed at protecting the rights of the patent 
holder.36 
The WTO has explicitly stated that each member nation has the free-
dom to determine the grounds upon which compulsory licenses may be 
granted.37 Article 31 lists several non-exclusive grounds for granting a 
compulsory license: national emergency or extreme urgency; public non-
commercial use;38 and remedy to anti-competitive practices.39 Although 
article 31 specifically mentions several grounds for issuing a license, it 
must be stressed that this list is not exclusive and it does not limit a 
member’s right to issue compulsory licenses based on other grounds.40 
However, the grant of a compulsory license on frivolous grounds, such 
as the individual interest of a competitor, is not a legitimate ground for 
granting a compulsory license because compulsory licenses are excep-
tions to patent rights and, as such, may only be used in exceptional cir-
cumstances.41 
                                                                                                             
 33. TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 4. 
 34. Id. 
 35. CORREA, supra note 25, at 313–14. 
 36. TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 4. 
 37. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5(b) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
[hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 38. “Public non-commercial use,” otherwise known as “government use,” is an act by 
the government of a member nation to exploit by itself or through the use of a private 
contractor a patented invention without consent of the patent owner. CORREA, supra note 
25, at 316. 
 39. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31. 
 40. CARLOS M. CORREA, PATENT RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189, 210 (1998). 
 41. NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 232 (2002). 
The compulsory licensing provision should be read together with the related provisions of 
article 27(1) which requires member countries to make patents available for any inven-
tions, including products or processes, and subject to the normal tests of novelty, inven-
tiveness, and industrial applicability. See Overview of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
18. Article 27(1) also requires that patents be enjoyed without discrimination as to the 
place where they were invented and whether the product is produced locally or imported. 
Id. 
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Although the TRIPS agreement is flexible regarding the grounds for is-
suing a compulsory license, the agreement subjects such licenses to a 
detailed list of conditions. Article 31(b) requires a country applying for a 
license to first attempt to negotiate a voluntary license from the patent 
holder under reasonable commercial terms and for a reasonable period of 
time.42 However, in situations of national emergencies, other circum-
stances of extreme urgency, or in cases of public non-commercial use, 
there is no need to try to negotiate for a voluntary license.43 Additionally, 
under the compulsory license, adequate remuneration must still be paid 
to the patent holder taking into account the economic value of the au-
thorization in each case.44 The scope and duration of the use of the com-
pulsory license is “limited to the purpose for which it was authorized”45 
and authorization of such use can be terminated “if and when the circum-
stances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”46 Fur-
thermore, article 31(f) states that a compulsory license shall be author-
ized “predominately for the supply of the domestic market of the Mem-
ber authorizing such use.”47 This condition has the practical effect of pre-
venting export of generic drugs to countries that do not have sufficient 
pharmaceutical industries to produce the drugs themselves.48 
In November 2001, the WTO nations held the Doha Ministerial Con-
ference (“Doha Declaration”) in order to clarify the terms and intention 
of the compulsory licensing provision.49 This conference resulted in the 
Doha Declaration. The Doha Declaration stressed that the TRIPS agree-
ment should be interpreted and implemented in such a manner so as to 
promote public health.50 The Declaration affirmed the government’s right 
to use the agreement’s flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing, in or-
der to protect public health and also clarified some of the grounds for 
granting a compulsory license.51 It stated that each member has the right 
                                                                                                             
 42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. art. 31(h). 
 45. Id. art. 31(c). 
 46. Id. art. 31(g). 
 47. Id. art. 31(f). 
 48. CORREA, supra note 25, at 321. 
 49. See generally Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS 
Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 964–66 (2000) 
(discussing the wide range of interpretations that developing and developed countries 
attach to the language in article 31). 
 50. Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 4. 
 51. See Divya Murthy, The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1299, 
1305 (2002) (noting that the ministerial text of the Doha Declaration intended to address 
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to determine what constitutes a “national emergency” or “other circum-
stance of extreme urgency” and that public crisis such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, can present such circum-
stances.52 
In addition, the Declaration recognized that some WTO members with 
insufficient manufacturing capacities were having difficulties making use 
of the compulsory licensing provision and instructed the Council for 
TRIPS to find an “expeditious solution to this problem.”53 On August 30, 
2003, in response to the Doha Declaration, WTO members adopted an 
amendment that solved the legal problem for exporting countries.54 The 
August 30 Decision waived exporting countries’ obligations under article 
31(f).55 Under this waiver, any member country may export generic 
pharmaceuticals made under compulsory licenses to meet the needs of 
importing countries that lack manufacturing capacity to make the drug.56 
For many years, compulsory licensing was typically used as a bargain-
ing tool for developing countries in their negotiations with pharmaceuti-
cal companies.57 However, after the Doha Declaration in 2002, develop-
                                                                                                             
two issues: the scope of the term “public health” and the ability of nations without ade-
quate manufacturing capacities to seek the benefits of compulsory licensing). 
 52. Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 5(c). The declaration also clarified what the 
grounds are for granting a compulsory license by stating that “each Member has the right 
to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those related to 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emer-
gency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id. 
 53. Id. ¶ 6. 
 54. TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 6. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. This waiver is itself subject to several conditions. The importing member must 
notify the TRIPS Council of the type and quantity of licensed product, and, except in the 
case of a least developed country, the importing member must establish a lack of manu-
facturing capacity to produce the drug. WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Decision of 30 August 2003, ¶ 
2(c), WT/L/540, http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc (Sept. 2, 
2003) [hereinafter August 30 Decision]. It is unclear what a member must do in order to 
establish “lack of manufacturing capacity.” The Annex of the Decision sets out two alter-
natives: (1) the member has established that it has no manufacturing capacity in the phar-
maceutical sector; or (2) the member has some manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceu-
tical sector but it is currently insufficient to meet its needs. Id. In addition, in order to 
prevent the emergence of a black market through re-exportation of the generic drug, the 
Decision requires that the generic drug must be clearly distinguished through specific 
labeling, packaging, or product coloring. Id. ¶ 2. Finally, the responsibility of “adequate 
remuneration” to the patent holder is still applicable although it only extends to the ex-
porting member. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
 57. Consumer Tech, supra note 11. 
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ing countries began utilizing the provision in order to obtain generic ver-
sions of HIV/AIDS medication.58 In 2004, Malaysia and Indonesia be-
came the first middle income countries to issue compulsory licenses for 
the importation of HIV/AIDS medications.59 In 2006, amidst much con-
troversy, Thailand issued a compulsory license for importation of the 
generic version of Efravinez, an HIV/AIDS medication.60 In the begin-
ning of 2007, Thailand announced that it would issue two more compul-
sory licenses for the HIV/AIDS drug Kaletra and the heart disease drug 
Plavix.61 Then, on May 4, 2007, for the first time in Brazil’s history, 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed a decree issuing a compulsory 
license for the Merck owned HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenez.62  
III. THE RECENT CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE DISPUTE BETWEEN 
BRAZIL AND MERCK 
A. About Brazil’s HIV/AIDS Program 
In order to better understand the recent controversy surrounding Bra-
zil’s actions, it is necessary to consider the factual background of the 
AIDS epidemic in Brazil. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(“AIDS”) is caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”).63 
First recognized in 1981, AIDS has since become a worldwide pan-
demic.64 HIV kills or damages cells in the body’s immune system caus-
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. After the Doha Declaration in 2002, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia 
became the first developing nations to issue a compulsory license for the production of 
Antiretroviral drugs (“ARVs”). Id. In 2005, three more low income countries issued a 
compulsory license for the importations of generic ARVs (Cameroon, Eritrea, and 
Ghana). Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. On November 29, 2006, Thailand’s Ministry of Health, without prior negotia-
tions with Efavirenz’s producer Merck, declared that it would issue a compulsory license 
for the importation of Efavirenz from India and pay Merck a royalty rate of 0.5%. Brook 
K. Baker, Price Cut Hand-Cuffs: Thailand Must Stand Up to Merck, IP-HEALTH, Dec. 3, 
2006, http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2006-December/010273.html. 
 61. Consumer Tech, supra note 11. On January 25, 2007, Thailand announced that it 
would issue compulsory licenses for Kaletra and Plavix. Id. The royalty rate to the patent 
holder under both licenses was 0.5%. Id. In addition, the Plavix license does not have a 
specific expiration date and will last until the patent has expired or there is no essential 
need. Id. 
 62. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 63. See Nat’l Inst. of Health, HIV Infection and AIDS: An Overview, 
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/hivinf.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2007) [hereinafter 
NIH Fact Sheet]. 
 64. Id. In 2006, there were approximately 39.5 million people living with the HIV 
virus worldwide and approximately 4.3 million new infections. UNAIDS, AIDS 
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ing sickness and death from illnesses that normally do not make healthy 
people sick.65 Antiretroviral drugs (“ARVs”) have been developed to 
disrupt the progress of HIV.66 ARVs have been proven to be effective at 
combating the virus but they are not a cure.67 A person taking ARVs 
must take them for life because if treatment is stopped, the virus will be-
come active again.68 
But the AIDS epidemic continues to devastate many developing coun-
tries.69 Approximately 24.7 million people are infected with HIV in Sub-
Saharan Africa, compared with 1.4 million people in North America.70 
So while the new drugs have lowered the rate of HIV infection in devel-
oped countries, the high cost of these drugs is not affordable for most 
people living with HIV/AIDS in developing countries.71 The local pro-
duction or importation of generic drugs could lower the price of essential 
medication, making the drugs affordable for people in developing na-
tions.72 A strong international patent system exacerbates the lack of ac-
cess problem for developing nations by inhibiting developing nations 
                                                                                                             
EPIDEMIC UPDATE 1, UNAIDS/06.29E (2006), available at http://data.unaids.org 
/pub/EpiReport/2006/2006_EpiUpdate_en.pdf [hereinafter UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE]. 
 65. NIH Fact Sheet, supra note 63. 
 66. UNAIDS: Policy and Practice—HIV Treatment, http://www.unaids.org/en/Policy 
AndPractice/HIVTreatment/default.asp (last visited June 06, 2008). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. UNAIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6, 
UNAIDS/06.20E (2006), available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2006/ 
2006_GR-ExecutiveSummary_en.pdf. “Africa remains the global epicenter of the AIDS 
pandemic. South Africa’s AIDS epidemic—one of the worst in the world—shows no 
evidence of a decline.” Id. 
 70. UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 64, at 65 (providing a global map of the 
number of people infected with HIV in different regions of the world). 
 71. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], PROGRESS REPORT: TOWARDS 
UNIVERSAL ACCESS—SCALING UP PRIORITY HIV/AIDS INTERVENTIONS IN THE HEALTH 
SECTOR 21 (2007), available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2007/20070925 
_oms_progress_report_en.pdf [hereinafter WHO PROGRESS REPORT]. Between 2003 and 
2005, the price of first-line ARVs has decreased between 37–53% in low and middle 
income countries. Id. at 6. Between 2005 and 2006, the price has decreased an additional 
10–20%. Id. However, the average prices paid for second line regimens remain unafford-
ably high in low and middle income countries where few generic alternatives are avail-
able. Id. at 21. In 2006, the most commonly used second-line regimen cost $1698 in low-
income countries and $4735 in middle-income countries. Id. at 22–23. 
 72. John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: 
Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 175, 177 (2001) (discussing the proper level of patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals in developing countries). 
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from buying the cheaper generic versions of the drug as a result of the 
patent owner’s exclusive rights to make and sell the drug.73 
Brazil is home to approximately one third of the total population of 
people infected with HIV/AIDS living in Latin America.74 Started in 
1997, Brazil’s highly praised anti-AIDS program provides free treatment 
to approximately 180,000 HIV/AIDS patients and has been credited for 
keeping the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Latin America under control.75 Bra-
zil’s provision of antiretroviral therapy is among the most comprehensive 
in the world and, according to the Joint United Nations Program on 
HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”), it has been yielding positive results.76 Brazil’s 
success in providing access to HIV/AIDS medication to its citizens has 
been attributed to “governmental commitment, the reduced cost of phar-
maceuticals made possible by domestic manufacture of generic drugs, 
and negotiated price discounts for other drugs.”77 
In furthering its campaign to provide affordable HIV/AIDS treatment, 
Brazil has used the threat of issuing a compulsory license as a means of 
negotiating lower prices with drug companies.78 In 2001, Merck re-
sponded to Brazil’s recent threat to issue a compulsory license by reduc-
ing the price of Stocrin, an HIV/AIDS medication.79 In August of the 
same year, Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche also agreed to lower 
the price of its AIDS-fighting drug Viracept by forty percent, in response 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. at 175–78. 
 74. UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 64, at 48. In 2005, there was a total of 1.7 
million people living with HIV in Latin America. Id. At the end of 2006, around 180,000 
of the 210,000 people in need of ARVs in Brazil were receiving them. WHO PROGRESS 
REPORT, supra note 71, at 64. 
 75. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 76. UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 64, at 49. Mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV declined from 16% in 1997 to less than 4% in 2002. Id. Between 1996 and 2002, 
AIDS mortality rates decreased by 50%, and AIDS-related hospitalizations dropped by 
80% during the same period. Id. UNAIDS has praised Brazil by stating that “Brazil’s 
dual emphasis on prevention and treatment has helped to keep its HIV epidemic under 
control.” Id. 
 77. Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options Un-
der TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 129 (2003). For 
example, between 1997 and 2001, the estimated annual cost of HIV therapy in Brazil has 
fallen from $7858 per person to $4137 per person. Id. This is at least two times lower 
than the cost of HIV therapy in the United States, which costs between $10,000 and 
$15,000 per patient per year. Id. 
 78. Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries 
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 209–10 (2002). 
 79. Id. at 209. In March 2001, Merck agreed to lower the prices of Indinavir and 
Efavirenz by 65% and 59%. In return, Brazil cancelled its plan to authorize generic pro-
duction of the drugs. See Consumer Tech, supra note 11. 
2008] EXPANDING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS MEDICATION 1111 
to Brazil’s threat to issue a compulsory license.80 Similarly, in 2003, 
Merck agreed to lower the price of ARV Kaletra after Brazil’s threat to 
issue a compulsory license for the drug.81 This pattern of threats and ne-
gotiations clearly demonstrates that Brazil’s threats to issue compulsory 
licenses for HIV/AIDS medications have resulted in lowering the costs 
of many essential drugs for the government’s HIV/AIDS program. 
B. The Recent Controversy: Brazil and Merck 
Despite Brazil’s previous success in negotiating with pharmaceutical 
companies, the cost of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program has almost doubled 
in the last several years,82 partially due to the increased demand for sec-
ond-line HIV/AIDS medication.83 At current prices, the annual cost of 
Merck’s Efavirenz for the Brazilian government was $42 million, at 
$1.59 per pill.84 Brazil’s health ministry claimed that they could import a 
generic version of the drug from India at a price of $0.45 per pill.85 Since 
2006, Brazil’s Ministry of Health has attempted to negotiate with Merck 
for a price reduction.86 Brazil stated that it wanted to pay the price for the 
drug that Merck currently offered to countries in similar income levels as 
                                                                                                             
 80. Bass, supra note 78, at 209. After unsuccessful negotiations over the price of the 
ARV Nelfinavir (sold under the brand name Viracept by Roche), Brazil’s Health Minister 
announced that his country will issue a compulsory license for the local production of the 
generic version of the drug. See Consumer Tech, supra note 11. Nine days later, Roche 
and Brazil reached an agreement for a 40% reduction in the price of the drug in exchange 
for Brazil not issuing the compulsory license. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. BNA Report, supra note 1. The cost of the program has increased from $247.5 
million to $445.5 million during the last several years. Id. 
 83. Medecines Sans Frontieres, The Second-line AIDS Crisis: Condemned to Repeat?, 
MSF ARTICLE, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm? 
component=article&objectid=65D58C38-15C5-F00A25DE21CB571D3E0E&method= 
full_html [hereinafter MSF Article]. “While the needs for second-line regimens are likely 
to increase in the coming years, medicines used for second-line therapy are mostly un-
available or unaffordable in developing countries.” Id. 
 84. BNA Report, supra note 1. According to the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”), Efavirenz is one the drugs used in the newly-recommended first-line ARV 
regimen for adults and adolescents. WHO, SOURCES AND PRICES OF SELECTED MEDICINES 
AND DIAGNOSTICS FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS 5, WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.4 (2004), 
available at http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pub02/jc645-sources_prices_en.pdf. 
Currently, 38% of patients take the drug and it is estimated that by the end of 2007, 
75,000 of the 200,000 patients currently on antiretroviral treatment in Brazil will be tak-
ing Efavirenz. Posting, Brazilian Government Declares Efavirenz to be of Public Interest, 
gabriela@abiaids.org.br, to EssentialDrugs.org (Apr. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Essential 
Drugs]. 
 85. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 86. Essential Drugs, supra note 84. 
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Brazil.87 On April 25, 2007, Brazil took the first step in the compulsory 
licensing process by declaring Efavirenz in “the public interest.”88 After 
the Health Ministry rejected Merck’s offer of $1.10 per pill, the Brazilian 
government took the final step in its compulsory licensing process by 
issuing a license to import the generic version of the drug from India 
while paying Merck royalties of 1.5%.89 The government claimed that 
the generic drug would permit an annual savings of $30 million on their 
anti-AIDS program.90 In justifying this unprecedented action, Brazil’s 
president stated that he was not willing to sacrifice the health of his 
country’s citizens for the sake of world trade.91 
IV. ANALYZING BRAZIL’S RESPONSE 
A. Brazil’s Actions are Valid Under the Compulsory Licensing Provision 
If Merck challenges the legal validity of Brazil’s actions under the 
compulsory licensing provision, the United States may take the dispute 
in front of the WTO’s international panel, the Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”), which is responsible for settling disputes between Member na-
tions.92 In determining whether Brazil’s actions are valid under the com-
                                                                                                             
 87. Press Release, Brazil Ministry of Health, Efavirenz: Questions About Compulsory 
Licensing (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.aids.gov.br/data/Pages/LUMISE77B47C8ITE 
MID74BBB449C36442B9B92D6ACC1D9DFC21ENIE.htm [hereinafter Brazil Health 
Web site—Efavirenz]. Brazil stated that the cost of the Merck’s Efavirenz is 136% higher 
in Brazil than in Thailand and that it would accept the same price offered to Thailand. Id. 
 88. Essential Drugs, supra note 83. Brazil’s compulsory licensing provision entails 
three steps: (1) declare in a decree that the product in question is “in the public interest”; 
(2) the government is required to negotiate with the company to see if a mutually accept-
able price can be reached; (3) the government will issue another decree if the negotiations 
fail and it decides to issue a compulsory license. Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, 
tgerhardsen@ip-watch.ch, to IP-Watch.org (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=614&res=1280&print=0. 
 89. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. “Between our trade and our health, we are going to take care of our health. It is 
not possible for someone to get rich from the misfortune of others.” Id. 
 92. WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO—SETTLING DISPUTES 56 (2007), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm#understanding_chapter 
(download Chapter 3: Settling Disputes for pdf version). Disputes arise under the TRIPS 
agreement when one country adopts a trade policy that another WTO Member believes to 
be violating the agreement. Id. at 55. The Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), composed 
of all WTO Members, is responsible for setting up panels to consider the case. Id. at 56. 
The decision of the panel is subject to review by a permanent appellate body. Id. Once a 
case has been decided, the losing “defendant” must conform its policy to the ruling of the 
panel. Id. at 58. If the losing party fails to conform to these rules, a suitable penalty, such 
as a sanction or tariff, may be imposed. Id. The DSB has never heard a case involving a 
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pulsory licensing provision of the TRIPS agreement, the DSB must first 
determine if Brazil has satisfied the conditions of the compulsory licens-
ing provision which restrict its use. 
The DSB will most likely find that Brazil’s use of the compulsory li-
censing provision is valid for three main reasons. First, Brazil has sought 
prior negotiation with the patent holder Merck and thus satisfies the con-
dition under article 31(b) requiring “reasonable” negotiation with the 
patent holder. Second, even if Brazil’s negotiations with Merck are not 
considered reasonable, Brazil actions are valid under either the national 
emergency or the public non-commercial use exceptions of article 31(b), 
which waive the reasonable negotiating requirement. Finally, Brazil’s 
use of the provision is valid because Brazil may import the generic 
Efravinez from India under the waiver of article 31(f) provided by the 
August 30 Decision. 
(i) Prior Reasonable Negotiation Requirement Under Article 31(b) 
The compulsory licensing provision is ambiguous about many of the 
conditions and grounds for issuing a license, thus leaving the provision 
open to different interpretations. First, article 31(b) states that unless the 
license is granted for a national emergency, other circumstance of ex-
treme urgency, or a public non-commercial use, the member must have 
previously attempted to negotiate with the patent owner under reasonable 
commercial terms and that such efforts have not been successful within a 
reasonable period of time.93 However, what is considered “reasonable” 
under this provision is not defined and has been left to national laws.94 
For example, a reasonable period of time has been considered anywhere 
between 90 days and 6 months.95 Although the United States may argue 
that Brazil has not attempted to negotiate for a reasonable period of time, 
this argument is not likely to be successful because prior to issuing the 
license, Brazil had negotiated with Merck for two years over the price of 
Efavirenz.96 
In arguing that Brazil did not negotiate under “reasonable commercial 
terms,” the United States may point out that Brazil consistently refused 
Merck’s offers which were based on fair terms. 97 However, Merck’s of-
                                                                                                             
challenge to a country’s use of the compulsory licensing provision. Consumer Tech, su-
pra note 11. 
 93. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b). 
 94. CORREA, supra note 25, at 320. 
 95. CARVALHO, supra note 41, at 234. 
 96. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4. 
 97. Gerhardsen, supra note 88. On a practical level, Merck has argued that the price 
of Efavirenz in Brazil is fair. Merck Statement, supra note 13. Merck bases its HIV pric-
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fers were not fair in this instance because its pricing scheme disregarded 
extremely relevant factors, such as the extent of the country’s population 
needing treatment and the actual number of patients currently being 
treated with the drug.98 For example, the cost of Efavirenz is 136% 
higher in Brazil than in Thailand, a country of comparable income 
level.99 In addition, approximately 75,000 people are taking Efavirenz in 
Brazil, while in Thailand only 17,000 people are taking the drug.100 Dur-
ing negotiations, Brazil informed Merck that it would accept a price the 
same price offered to Thailand, namely $0.65 per tablet.101 However, the 
lowest price Merck offered to Brazil was $1.10 per tablet.102 Thus, 
Merck’s reduced price offers were not consistent with the international 
pricing scheme for the drug and cannot be considered fair. 
In response, the United States may argue that Brazil’s repeated use of 
the compulsory licensing provision as a bargaining tool does not qualify 
as negotiating under reasonable commercial terms.103 It will argue that by 
threatening to issue a compulsory license during negotiations with phar-
maceutical companies, Brazil was not bargaining under reasonable 
commercial terms. Brazil may respond by arguing that the threat of issu-
ing a compulsory license has provided a tactical advantage in prior nego-
tiations and did not prevent successful agreements with pharmaceutical 
companies.104 Thus, Brazil will argue that threatening to issue a compul-
sory license during negotiations qualifies as negotiating under reasonable 
commercial terms. It is unclear whether the DSB will consider the threat 
of using the provision as bargaining under reasonable commercial terms. 
However, the DSB will find that under the national emergency or the 
public non-commercial use exception of 31(b), the requirement to bar-
gain under reasonable commercial terms has been waived. 
                                                                                                             
ing policy on the comparable wealth and disease burden of the country. Id. Brazil is the 
world’s twelfth largest economy and has a much lower rate of infection than many coun-
tries at its income level. Id. Thus Brazil has a greater capacity to pay for HIV/AIDS 
medicines than countries that are poorer or harder hit by the disease. Id. 
 98. Brazil Health Web site—Efavirenz, supra note 87. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 103. See Consumer Tech, supra note 11 (citing examples of Brazil’s threats to issue a 
compulsory license that resulted in lower drug prices). 
 104. Consumer Tech, supra note 11. Until the current dispute with Merck, the pharma-
ceutical companies have reacted positively to Brazil’s threats to issue a compulsory li-
cense by lowering prices and reaching an agreement with Brazil. Id. 
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(ii) The National Emergency and Public Non-Commercial Use Excep-
tions Under Article 31(b) 
The requirement of reasonable prior negotiations with the patent holder 
under article 31(b)105 is waived because Brazil’s compulsory license falls 
under both the national emergency and public non-commercial use ex-
ceptions to article 31(b). 
Brazil’s compulsory license falls under the national emergency excep-
tion to article 31(b) and thus Brazil was not required to negotiate with 
Merck prior to issuing the license. Brazil’s compulsory license was is-
sued for an HIV/AIDS medication.106 The WTO has explicitly stated that 
HIV/AIDS can qualify as a national emergency. 107 Thus, Brazil’s use of 
the provision falls under the national emergency exception because 
Efavirenz will be used in the government’s HIV/AIDS program.108 
The United States may argue that although the WTO has stated that 
AIDS “can” constitute a national emergency or other circumstance of 
extreme urgency, this does not necessarily mean that Brazil’s AIDS epi-
demic actually does constitute such circumstances. In fact, the United 
States will point out that Brazil’s rate of infection is much lower than in 
many countries, thus bolstering its argument that Brazil’s AIDS epidemic 
does not qualify as a national emergency.109 However, an important rea-
son for Brazil’s low rate of infection is the country’s ability to obtain 
affordable medicine, either through negotiations with pharmaceutical 
companies or through actual use of the compulsory licensing provi-
sion.110 In addition, the WTO has avoided a clear declaration of what is 
considered a national emergency and has explicitly stated that each coun-
try must decide for itself the conditions of a national emergency.111 This 
demonstrates that the DSB is unlikely to require that a country be 
                                                                                                             
 105. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b). 
 106. See BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 107. See Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 5(c). 
 108. See BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 109. Ubiraja Regis Quintanilha Marques, Valesak Santos Guimaraes & Caitlin Stern-
berg, Brazil’s AIDS Controversy: Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents, and Compul-
sory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 471 (2005). As a result of Brazil’s extensive 
anti-AIDS program, only about 600,000 Brazilians are infected with the disease. Id. This 
is less than one percent of the adult population. Id. 
 110. Lazzarini, supra note 77, at 129. Brazil’s success in providing access to AIDS 
medication to its citizens has been attributed to “governmental commitment, the reduced 
cost of pharmaceuticals made possible by domestic manufacture of generic drugs, and 
negotiated price discounts for other drugs.” Id. 
 111. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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“steeped in disease”112 before it can invoke the national emergency ex-
ception under article 31(b). Thus, under the national emergency excep-
tion, Brazil was not required to engage in reasonable negotiations with 
Merck prior to issuing the license. 
Furthermore, Brazil was not required to negotiate with Merck before 
issuing the license because Brazil’s compulsory license falls under the 
public non-commercial use exception to 31(b).113 Prior to issuing the li-
cense, Brazil’s government declared Efavirenz to be in the “public inter-
est” in light of the need to ensure the viability of the government’s 
HIV/AIDS treatment program.114 Thus, the license was granted for a 
public non-commercial use because Efavirenz is part of the Brazilian 
government’s HIV/AIDS program.115 The United States will counter that 
Brazil’s use of the provision is not a public non-commercial use because 
the government is importing the generic drug from a private Indian 
manufacturer.116 However, the non-commercial nature of the use does 
not prevent the government from hiring a commercial contractor to actu-
ally exploit the patents on behalf of the government.117 Thus, Brazil’s 
actions are valid under the public non-commercial use exception in arti-
cle 31(b). 
(iii) Conditions of Compulsory Licensing Under Article 31(f) and the 
August 30 Decision 
The most contentious aspect of the validity of Brazil’s actions under 
article 31 is Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision to import 
generic Efavirenz from India.118 Although the August 30 Decision allows 
countries to import generic drugs by waiving article 31(f) of the compul-
sory licensing provision, the August 30 Decision requires that the im-
porting country establish a lack of manufacturing capacity.119 The United 
States will argue that Brazil cannot establish a lack of manufacturing ca-
pacity because the country is itself a major producer of generic drugs.120 
                                                                                                             
 112. Jennifer Bjornberg, Brazil’s Recent Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution or 
Retaliation?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 218 (2006). 
 113. See CORREA, supra note 25, at 316 (describing the public non-commercial use 
exception in article 31). 
 114. See Essential Drugs, supra note 84. 
 115. See Essential Drugs, supra note 84. 
 116. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 117. CORREA, supra note 25, at 317. 
 118. See BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 119. See TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 6. 
 120. MARQUES ET. AL., supra note 109, at 473. Eight of the sixteen ARVs used in the 
anti-AIDS cocktails provided by the Brazilian government are manufactured in Brazil. Id. 
Compulsory licenses are not needed for these drugs because Brazil began to manufacture 
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However, the August 30 Decision does not require a country to dem-
onstrate that it has no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor.121 In fact, a lack of manufacturing capacity may also mean that a 
country has some manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector 
but that it is currently insufficient to meet its needs.122 Thus Brazil may 
argue that it has established a lack of manufacturing capacity to produce 
generic Efavirenz because its pharmaceutical laboratories are currently 
unable to produce a safe generic version of the drug. In order to ensure 
the quality, safety, and effectiveness of the generic drug, Brazil will only 
use generics produced from laboratories that are pre-qualified by the 
World Health Organization (“WHO”).123 Currently, all the laboratories 
producing generic Efavirenz that are WHO pre-qualified are located in 
India.124 Thus, Brazil currently lacks manufacturing capacity to produce 
generic Efavirenz because its laboratories are not WHO pre-qualified to 
produce the drug. 
(iv) Brazil’s Compulsory License for Efavirenz is Valid Under Article 31 
As this dispute demonstrates, there are many undefined and ambiguous 
terms in the compulsory licensing provision, which leave it open to dif-
ferent interpretations. So far, only a handful of countries have utilized the 
provision in the context of pharmaceuticals125 and the DSB has yet to 
resolve a dispute resulting from the use of article 31 to import or produce 
generic HIV/AIDS drugs.126 If the United States challenges Brazil’s use 
                                                                                                             
these drugs before Brazil was forced to recognize patents for pharmaceutical drugs under 
the TRIPS agreement. Id. 
 121. See TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 6. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Press Release, Brazil Ministry of Health, Treatment of AIDS: Brazil Issues Com-
pulsory License for Efavirenz (May 4, 2007) http://www.aids.gov.br/data/Pages/ 
LUMISCEBD192AENIE.htm (click on “More National Programme News,” go to page 
3) [hereinafter Brazil Health Web site—Treatment of AIDS]. The WHO’s pre-
qualification program lists manufacturers and suppliers whose HIV-related medicines 
have been found acceptable for procurement by U.N. agencies. WHO, PRE-
QUALIFICATION PROGRAMME: ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2007), available at 
http://healthtech.who.int/pq/default.htm (click on Annual Report 2007 under quick-links 
on the right side). 
 124. Brazil Health Web site—Treatment of AIDS, supra note 123. See also WHO, 
PRE-QUALIFICATION PROGRAMME: ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS AND DIAGNOSTICS OF 
ACCEPTABLE QUALITY 3–4 (2007), available at http://healthtech.who.int/pq/ (click on 
pdf). 
 125. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
   126. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Index of Dispute Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/tra 
top_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#trips (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). There have 
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of the compulsory licensing provision, the DSB will most likely find that 
Brazil’s recent actions are valid under article 31. Ultimately though, how 
this dispute is resolved in front of the DSB will create important prece-
dent by defining many of the ambiguities in the compulsory licensing 
provision. The resolution of the DSB will be an important factor in de-
termining if and how this provision will be used in the future. 
B. Brazil’s Actions Set Good Policy for the Future Use of the Compul-
sory Licensing Provision 
In justifying his country’s unprecedented use of the compulsory licens-
ing provision, Brazil’s president stated that he was not willing to sacri-
fice the health of his country’s citizens for the sake of world trade.127 
This statement reflects the concern of many developing nations that 
strong intellectual property rights over pharmaceuticals prevents impov-
erished people from having access to life-saving medication. By allowing 
generic manufacturers to override the patent holder’s rights, compulsory 
licensing provides a flexible and direct means for the rapid development 
of generics.128 The introduction of generics creates competition in the 
pharmaceutical market and has been proven to reduce the cost of medi-
cine.129 The effect of the compulsory licensing provision to lower drug 
prices is demonstrated in Brazil. By using the compulsory licensing pro-
vision to import generic Efavirenz from India, the Brazilian government 
is saving $30 million annually on their anti-AIDS program.130 Thus, by 
lowering drug prices, compulsory licenses allow countries to provide 
greater access to medicines for their citizens. 
However, the pharmaceutical industry’s response to Brazil’s issuance 
of a compulsory license has been extremely negative. Merck has stated 
that it is “profoundly disappointed” by the decision of the Brazilian gov-
ernment to issue a compulsory license for Efavirenz131 and considers the 
                                                                                                             
only been two complaints filed with the DSB relating to pharmaceuticals. Id. Neither of 
these complaints involve the use of compulsory licenses. Id. 
 127. BNA Report, supra note 1. “Between our trade and our health, we are going to 
take care of our health. It is not possible for someone to get rich from the misfortune of 
others.” Id. 
 128. Weissman, supra note 7, at 1116–20. 
 129. Id. “The empirical evidence in support of the price-reducing effects of the intro-
duction of generics is overwhelming.” Id. at 117. Empirical studies reveal that patents are 
a major factor in sustaining high drug prices and the introduction of generics lowers drug 
prices to the production costs. Id. 
 130. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 131. Merck Statement, supra note 13. The company says that it had attempted to nego-
tiate in good faith with Brazil and remains flexible and committed to reaching a mutually 
acceptable agreement with the Brazilian government. Id. 
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recent actions of Brazil to be a “major step backward.”132 Merck main-
tains that Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision does not set 
good policy for two reasons. First, Merck argues that Brazil’s use of the 
provision sets bad precedent because it will encourage overuse of the 
provision, which will have a “chilling effect” on the R&D incentives of 
pharmaceutical companies. Second, Merck argues that Brazil’s use of the 
provision will discourage foreign investment and that it may deter phar-
maceutical companies from introducing new life-saving drugs in Brazil. 
Merck’s first argument is that by overriding the exclusive rights of the 
patent holder to produce and sell the drug, Brazil “sends a chilling sig-
nal” to pharmaceutical companies who develop life-saving drugs for dis-
eases that afflict the developing world.133 Research and development is a 
costly and risky process.134 Pharmaceutical companies rely on patent pro-
tection in order to recoup a premium for the high research and develop-
ment costs in creating a new drug.135 By breaking patents where it is not 
absolutely necessary, developing countries may be discouraging pharma-
ceutical companies from creating new life-saving medications. 
This argument is particularly relevant in the case of Brazil. Brazil is 
classified as an “upper-middle income country” and is the twelfth largest 
economy in the world.136 In addition, Brazil has a very successful 
HIV/AIDS program and has been able to control the spread of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic within its borders.137 In this way, Brazil appears to 
                                                                                                             
 132. Brazil Issues Compulsory License for AIDS Drug, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS 
DIGEST, May 9, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-05-09/story4.htm. 
 133. Merck Statement, supra note 13. 
 134. PhRMA Press Release, supra note 13. Last year alone, the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry invested $55 billion on research and development [“R&D”] of new medications. 
Id. Currently, there are seventy-seven medicines and vaccines being developed for 
HIV/AIDS. Id. See also Bruce Lehman & Michael Einhorn, Intellectual Property and 
Compulsory Licensing: Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World (on file with author). 
“The research process for new drugs is daunting.” Id. at 4. The development of new drugs 
averages 15 years. Id. There is a high risk of failure and “most efforts at innovation fail.” 
Id. at 5. The average new drug costs up to $800 million to develop, while the generic 
version costs under two million. Id. 
 135. PhRMA press release, supra note 13. See also Lehman & Einhorn, supra note 
134. Several studies have confirmed the correlation between patent protection and R&D. 
Id. at 5. In fact, one study concluded that 60 percent of drug inventions in a representative 
time period would not have been developed without patent protection. Id. 
 136. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Rank Order— 
GDP, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank 
.html (last visited May 30, 2008). 
 137. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Rank Order—HIV/AIDS 
Adult Prevalence Rate, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook 
/rankorder/2155rank.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). The rate of adult HIV/AIDS infec-
1120 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3 
be in a much less desperate situation than many countries who suffer not 
only from high rates of HIV/AIDS infection, but also from floundering 
economies and infrastructure. Because Brazil is a relatively wealthy na-
tion and has been successful in controlling the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it 
may be argued that Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision is 
not appropriate because it is not necessary. The use of the compulsory 
licensing provision where it is not absolutely necessary may lead coun-
tries down a slippery slope to overuse the provision, thereby discourag-
ing R&D by pharmaceutical companies. Thus, Brazil sets a negative ex-
ample for how the compulsory licensing provision should be used by 
encouraging overuse of the provision and thereby disincentivising the 
R&D of new life-saving medications. 
However, although strong patent protection may impede R&D by 
pharmaceutical companies, this claim has been exaggerated, especially in 
the context of developing countries. Pharmaceutical companies, driven 
by profits, invest most of their money in researching drugs for diseases 
that afflict developed nations.138 For example, twenty-one percent of the 
global disease burden139 comes from malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea, and 
tuberculosis.140 However, these diseases received less than one percent of 
all public and private investment in health research.141 A recent report 
from the British Government’s Commission on Intellectual Property 
                                                                                                             
tion in Brazil in 2003 was 0.70%, compared with the rate in the United States of 0.60%. 
Id. 
 138. Joseph Stiglitz, Dying in the Name of Monopoly, BUSINESS DAY, Mar. 9, 2007, 
available at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A407148. See 
also GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH 
2003–2004, at 122–23 (2004), http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/002__What%20 
we%20do/005__Publications/001__10%2090%20reports.php (click on chapter 5) [here-
inafter THE 10/90 REPORT]. Data on the site shows that the most dangerous and wide-
spread diseases receive the least percentage of total investment in health research. Id. The 
global disease burden combines death, morbidity, and disability in one figure to create an 
effective measuring tool for measuring conditions that are not on the priority list. Global 
Forum for Health Research, The 10/90 Gap: Themes–Burden of Disease, available at 
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/003__The%2010%2090%20gap/003__Themes/0
01__Burden%20of%20disease.php [hereinafter Themes—Burden of Disease]. 
 139. The global disease burden combines death, morbidity, and disability in one figure 
to create an effective measuring tool for measuring conditions that are not on the priority 
list. Global Forum for Health Research, The 10/90 Gap: Themes–Burden of Disease, 
available at http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/003__The%2010%2090%20gap/003 
__Themes/001__Burden%20of%20disease.php [hereinafter Themes—Burden of Dis-
ease]. 
 140. THE 10/90 REPORT, supra note 138, at 122. These diseases have an overwhelming 
or exclusive incidence in poor countries. Id. at 123. 
 141. Id. at 122. 
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Rights found that “the IP system hardly plays any role in stimulating re-
search on diseases particularly prevalent in developing countries, except 
for those diseases where there is also a substantial market in the devel-
oped world.”142 This demonstrates that the patent protection provided in 
developing countries does not heavily contribute to the incentives of 
pharmaceutical companies for research and development because phar-
maceutical companies are investing in drugs primarily for the benefit of 
developed countries. 
Moreover, Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision was ap-
propriate because it is necessary for Brazil to use the compulsory licens-
ing provision in order to maintain its successful HIV/AIDS program. The 
cost of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program is rising, partially due to the high 
cots of second-line HIV/AIDS medication.143 In addition, an important 
part of Brazil’s success in its HIV/AIDS program is due to Brazil’s abil-
ity to bargain for lower prices with pharmaceutical companies by threat-
ening to issue a compulsory license.144 By utilizing the compulsory li-
censing provision after repeated threats to do so, Brazil sends a clear 
message to pharmaceutical companies that it is serious about the health 
of its citizens. 
Secondly, Merck argues that Brazil’s actions will have a negative im-
pact on “Brazil’s reputation as an industrialized country” seeking to at-
tract foreign investment.145 This is because pharmaceutical companies 
may cease investing and introducing new drugs in countries where the 
compulsory licensing provision has been invoked and where the gov-
ernment of these countries does not provide sufficient protection of intel-
lectual property rights. This argument is especially relevant in light of the 
recent dispute between Abbott Laboratories and Thailand. During the 
past year, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for the anti-retroviral 
drugs Efavirenz and Kaletra and for the heart disease medication 
Plavix.146 The Thai government engaged in limited negotiations with 
pharmaceutical companies prior to issuing the licenses, claiming that 
prior negotiation with pharmaceutical companies is not an effective 
                                                                                                             
 142. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENTAL POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 (2002),  
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPR_Exec_Sumfinal.pdf. 
 143. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 145. Merck Statement, supra note 13. 
 146. MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY OFFICE 
THAILAND, FACTS AND EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE 
GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND 
Preface (2007), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=7349 (link 
to pdf is in the middle of the page) [hereinafter Thailand White Paper]. 
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means of getting a price reduction.147 As a result of Thailand’s decision 
to use the compulsory licensing provision, Abbott announced that it will 
not introduce new medicines into the country.148 Abbott’s reaction 
shocked the international community because Thailand’s citizens will be 
deprived of several new essential drugs as a result of Abbott’s with-
drawal from the Thai market.149 
Although Abbott’s reaction may not be justified, it is a potential hazard 
for a country that plans to use the compulsory licensing provision. How-
ever, Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision remains good 
policy because it is readily distinguished from the situation in Thailand. 
Unlike Thailand’s use of the compulsory licensing provision, Brazil only 
used the provision one time, it engaged in long negotiations with Merck 
prior to issuing the license, and it used the provision to import generic 
HIV/AIDS drugs.150 
First, unlike Thailand, which issued three licenses within a three month 
period, Brazil has used the compulsory licensing provision only once in 
its entire history.151 Although Brazil has made repeated threats to use the 
provision in its negotiations with pharmaceutical companies, this is dif-
ferent than actual use of the provision because there remains a possibility 
of negotiating an agreement between the parties. This is demonstrated by 
the successful negotiations of the Brazilian government, which has been 
able to use the threat of compulsory licensing in order to negotiate for 
lower drug prices without resorting to actual use of the provision.152 
Second, Brazil’s situation is different from Thailand because Brazil at-
tempted to negotiate with Merck for two years prior to issuing the li-
                                                                                                             
 147. Id. at 6. 
 148. On March 16, 2007, Abbott Laboratories announced that it would no longer intro-
duce new medicines in Thailand. Abbott Says it Will Not Introduce New Drugs in Thai-
land, 21 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 04 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter BNA Report 
Thailand]. The company was responding to Thailand’s recent decisions to issue compul-
sory licenses on “essential” medications. Id. Abbott’s spokeswoman justified her com-
pany’ actions by explaining that Thailand chose to break numerous patents on medicines, 
ignoring the patent system and as a result, Abbott elected to not introduce new medicines 
into the country. Id. 
 149. Id. The international non-profit organization Doctors Without Borders has called 
this decision “appalling” and “a major betrayal to patients.” Id. Among the drugs that will 
not be introduced in Thailand as a result of Abbott’s withdrawal from the Thai market is 
the heat-stable version of the vital second-line anti-retroviral Lopinavir. MSF Article, 
supra note 83. This anti-retroviral is needed in HIV/AIDS programs and has several ad-
vantages, most importantly the fact that it does not need to be refrigerated. Id. 
 150. See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
 151. Consumer Tech, supra note 11. 
 152. Id. 
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cense.153 Although prior negotiations may not have been necessary under 
the national emergency or non-commercial use exceptions of the com-
pulsory licensing provision,154 Brazil’s willingness to negotiate an 
agreement with Merck prior to issuing the license sends a positive signal 
to pharmaceutical companies by demonstrating that Brazil is serious 
about patent protection. 
Finally, Brazil’s case is distinguishable from Thailand because Brazil 
did not use the provision to import a controversial drug. Thailand’s use 
of the provision to produce Plavix, a heart disease medication,155 is con-
tentious because it demonstrates that Thailand is willing to invoke the 
provision for any drug available on the market, even for drugs that are 
primarily sold to developed countries.156 Moreover, this is the first time 
the provision has been used to produce a chronic disease medication and 
it is unclear if such drugs are an acceptable use of the compulsory licens-
ing provision.157 By contrast, Brazil used the compulsory licensing provi-
sion to produce generic HIV/AIDS drugs.158 The use of the compulsory 
licensing provision for HIV/AIDS medication is not controversial be-
cause HIV/AIDS is explicitly listed in the provision under the national 
emergency exception159 and the provision has been used several times 
before to produce generic HIV/AIDS drugs.160 
The differences between Brazil and Thailand’s use of the compulsory 
licensing provision are further highlighted by Abbott’s reaction to Bra-
zil’s compulsory license. In July of 2007, Abbott agreed to provide Bra-
zil a 29.5% reduction on its HIV/AIDS drug Kaletra.161 The disparate 
reactions of the pharmaceutical industry and the major differences be-
tween the countries’ use of the compulsory licensing provision demon-
strates that, unlike Thailand, Brazil’s use of the provision sets a positive 
example for how the compulsory licensing provision should be used in 
the future. 
                                                                                                             
 153. See EssentialDrugs, supra note 84. 
 154. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b). 
 155. BNA Report Thailand, supra note 148. 
 156. BNA Report Thailand, supra note 148. The pharmaceutical industry is concerned 
that Thailand’s actions indicate that compulsory licensing will become a “routine occur-
rence in the operation of Thailand’s public health system.” Id. 
 157. For a discussion of the validity of Thailand’s compulsory license for Plavix and 
its effect on international health and trade, see Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test: Compul-
sory Licensing in an Era of Epidemiological Transition, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211 (2007). 
 158. BNA Report, supra note 1. 
 159. Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 5(c). 
 160. Consumer Tech, supra note 11. 
 161. Government Abbott Reach Agreement to Reduce Price of AIDS Drug Kaletra, 21 
World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 08 (Aug. 2007). 
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Although Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision sets good 
policy, a country seeking to invoke the compulsory licensing provision 
must exercise caution. The situation in Thailand demonstrates that use of 
the compulsory licensing provision is risky. This is because pharmaceu-
tical companies may stop introducing drugs into a developing country if 
they believe that the country is not respectful of patent protection on 
pharmaceuticals. Thus the future of compulsory licensing remains uncer-
tain and the use of the provision must be evaluated according to the cir-
cumstances in each case. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of pharmaceuticals, the compulsory licensing provision 
in the TRIPS agreement has most often been used to provide generic 
HIV/AIDS drugs for least developed countries.162 Brazil’s recent use of 
compulsory licensing calls into question the scope and meaning of the 
provision by asking whether a large middle-income country like Brazil, 
with a relatively low rate of infection,163 should be able to use the provi-
sion in order to import generic HIV/AIDS medication. The text of the 
compulsory licensing provision and the Doha Declaration support the 
legal validity of Brazil’s actions. Likewise, in the context of HIV/AIDS, 
Brazil’s actions create good policy for the future use of the provision by 
middle-income countries. However, as the recent dispute between Abbott 
and Thailand demonstrates, use of compulsory licensing is a risky en-
deavor and may not set good policy in every circumstance. 
The goal of the TRIPS agreement is to balance the protection of intel-
lectual property in order to incentivize future R&D while providing vari-
ous exceptions, such as compulsory licensing, in order to reduce the 
short term costs of intellectual property protection. Although compulsory 
licensing provides a mechanism for increasing access to medicines in 
developing countries, this option is difficult and risky. Furthermore, in 
the context of pharmaceuticals, the protection of intellectual property 
raises an ethical dilemma. Questions of intellectual property in this con-
text can be a life or death matter because residents of developing coun-
tries are dying of diseases such as AIDS because they cannot afford to 
buy essential medications. 
There have been many proposed solutions that address the access to 
medicine gap between developed and developing countries.164 One such 
                                                                                                             
 162. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text. 
 164. For example, the economist Joseph Steiglitz proposes a system of financial gov-
ernment prizes to complement the current patent system. Joseph E. Steiglitz, Editorial, 
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solution addresses the role of research universities, who have a responsi-
bility to ensure that their research reaches the people who need it most.165 
Universities are a major contributor to pharmaceutical patent innovation 
and they own patent rights to key HIV/AIDS drugs that are on the mar-
ket.166 Universities can manage their pharmaceutical patents to ensure 
that the HIV/AIDS medications that are a product of university research 
are sold at affordable prices in developing countries.167 This means that 
universities can bargain for specific licensing terms in their agreements 
with pharmaceutical companies that will ensure low-cost access to phar-
maceuticals in the developing world.168 This approach requires that stu-
                                                                                                             
Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1279, 1279–80 (2006), 
available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/333/7582/1279. The prizes will encourage 
research on neglected diseases that mostly afflict developing countries, such as malaria 
and tuberculosis. Id. This medical prize fund would give large rewards for cures or vac-
cines for diseases like malaria, that affect millions, and smaller rewards for drugs that are 
minor variations on existing ones. Id. The prizes would be funded by governments in 
developed countries. Id.  
  Another solution to the current international patent system is proposed by Jean 
Lanjouw, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, who argues that setting minimum 
standards of patent protection in all countries is unfair. Jean O. Lanjouw, Opening Doors 
to Research: A New Global Patent Regime for Pharmaceuticals, 21 BROOKINGS REV. 13–
17 (2003). Lanjouw argues that patent rights in developing countries make drugs such as 
ARVs unaffordable and do not encourage research on diseases that primarily affect de-
veloping countries. Id. Lanjouw suggests that in order for a system of intellectual prop-
erty to be fair, it will need to recognize the differences in the development level of coun-
tries. Id. One solution is to establish a system where patent protection in poor countries 
differs across diseases depending on the importance of those countries’ markets as a po-
tential source of research incentives. Id. Thus, patent protection would be minimal in the 
poorest countries and would increase gradually to cover more diseases, starting with dis-
eases like malaria that are particularly prevalent in developing countries. Id. 
 165. Dave A. Chokshi & Rahul Rajkumar, Leveraging University Research to Advance 
Global Health, 298 J. AM. MED.  ASS’N 1934, 1934 (2007). 
 166. Id.  In 2002, research universities in the U.S. were estimated to have contributed 
$19.6 billion to “the drug development pipeline.” Id. University hold patents to one third 
of HIV drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration between 1987 and 
2007. Id.  
 167. Id. at 1935. 
 168. Id. at 1935. One such successful campaign took place at Yale University where a 
coalition of students and faculty requested that Yale, the patent holder to an important 
ARV, negotiate with Bristol-Meyers Squibb, the distributor of this ARV. Rahul Rajku-
mar, The Role of Universities in Addressing the Access and Research Gaps, Universities 
Allied for Essential Medicines National Conference 7–11 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.essentialmedicine.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2007/10/uaemconferenc
e2007-day-1-role-of-universities.pdf. Yale successfully worked with Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb to ensure that its patents do not prevent inexpensive HIV/AIDS therapy in devel-
oping countries. Id. 
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dents organize local, campus-based campaigns in order to pressure uni-
versities to include access provisions in their licensing agreements with 
pharmaceutical companies.169 Through local activism, the students and 
faculty of research universities can have a major impact on the high price 
of medication in developing countries. 
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